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JUDICATURE
A CLOSER LOOK at NEW PLEADING
n the LITIGATION MARKETPLACE
By Scott Dodson
COURTS AND PARTIES UNDOUBTEDLY ARE AFFECTED BY
THE NEW PLEADING REGIME OF TWOMBLYAND IOBAL.
BUT, AS RATIONAL ACTORS, THEY ALSO ARE RESPONSIVE
TO IT. THEIR RESPONSIVE BEHAVIORS BOTH MITIGATE
THE EXPECTED EFFECTS OF NEW PLEADING AND CAUSE
UNINTENDED EFFECTS. ASSESSING NEW PLEADING THUS
REQUIRES UNDERSTANDING AND CONSIDERATION OF
THESE MARKET FORCES AND REACTIVE IMPLICATIONS.
We are now more than five years out
from the momentous shift in federal
civil pleading standards from the old
"notice pleading" regime of Conley v.
Gibson, to the "New Pleading"2 regime
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, and
Ashcroft v. Iqba1.4 Although many
courts and commentators promptly
weighed in on the import of this shift,
distance can be useful; time often tells
whether developments are net positive
or negative.
But part of the problem of assess-
ing New Pleading, even with time, is
that legal changes do not have static
effects. Judges, parties, and lawyers
are rational actors. They respond to
changes in doctrine and practice with
their own changes.5 These secondary
responses may temper or exacerbate
the observable effects of New Pleading,
and they may cause unintended effects.
This essay situates New Pleading in
the broader litigation marketplace
and argues that evaluating its effects
is both more complex than initially
supposed and likely to continue to be
hard to assess.
OLD PLEADING, NEW PLEADING
Historical, doctrinal, and social detail
about the evolution of federal plead-
ing standards in the United States is
available elsewhere' and need not be
repeated here. But I do want to reiter-
ate briefly some basics to set the stage
for considering the impact of what has
changed.
Rule 8(a)(2), which still reads as
it has since 1938, requires only "a
short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.", This standard is quite different
from - deliberately so - the plead-
ing standards in America's past and in
most of the present world., The draft-
ers intentionally omitted any reference
to facts., Their goal was to reduce the
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gatekeeping function of pleadings -
open the doors wider - and require
only fair notice of the claim sufficient
to enable a defendant to respond." '
Provide notice, and as long as you
don't sue for a cause of action that the
law does not recognize, you generally
survive a motion to dismiss.
Of course, fair notice requires some
facts; otherwise, the defendant would
not know how to respond. But the
remedy for a defect in notice stemming
from factual insufficiency is a motion
for a more definitive statement, not a
motion to dismiss., That remedy alone
suffices to ensure that troublesomely
bare complaints will not go forward
without more detail.
The Supreme Court opinion in
Conley v. Gibson2 confirmed all this
in 1957, and it put an end to what
some have called the Third Pleading
War.13 After Conley, it was clear that
the pleading rules accepted the costs
of false positives (letting some plain-
tiffs with meritless claims through
the pleading stage) in exchange for
the benefits of broad court access and
avoidance of false negatives (shutting
out some plaintiffs with meritorious
claims).14 The Conley standard for
dismissing a complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) was whether it was "beyond
doubt" that the plaintiff could prove
"no set of facts" to establish relief.1
5
Such was the state of federal plead-
ing law for 50 years, and Conley held
a place of prominence in all of the
major procedure casebooks in U.S. law
schools. Although a few subsequent
opinions seemed to create some tension
with Conley, the major pleadings deci-
sions by the Supreme Court after Conley
tended to reaffirm it and its liberal
standard emphatically."°
Then, in 2007 and 2009, the
Supreme Court decided a pair of cases
that altered Conley's pleading regime.
These cases - Twombly and Iqbal-
did not change Conley's screen for legal
sufficiency. They left untouched the
requirements that a complaint provide
notice and that the complaint state a
legally recognized claim for relief. But
they added a new factual-sufficiency
requirement of "plausibility.""
This "New Pleading" standard
requires the complaint to survive a
two-step test. First, the court must
disregard all conclusory allegations in
the complaint. Second, the court must
determine, using "judicial experience
and common sense," whether the
remaining allegations state a "plausi-
ble" claim for relief.18
Naturally, what is "conclusory" and
what is "plausible" are still somewhat
unclear. And how judges will use their
"judicial experience and common
sense" is hard to predict. But what is
clear is that New Pleading is a trans-
substantive change that imposes a new
and more difficult pleading require-
ment. Now, in addition to the notice
and legal-sufficiency requirements that
always existed, plaintiffs must over-
come a factual-sufficiency hurdle that
requires judges to disregard conclusory
allegations and assess the complaint for
plausibility.
How meaningful is New Pleading?
That is the $65 million question. In this
essay, I hope to show that although we
know some things about the effects of
New Pleading, assessing New Pleading
is, in general, a highly complicated
endeavor. Understanding that complex-
ity should give pause to reflect upon
how best to approach our assessments
of New Pleading and how best to move
forward from it.
THE EFFECTS OF THE LITIGATION
MARKETPLACE
If the pleading standard has become
more difficult for claimants, one
might expect to see a higher dismissal
rate after Iqbal. Indeed, the available
empirical evidence suggests that New
Pleading is having some impact on
dismissal rates in federal court. The
studies to date consistently reveal
single-digit increases in the dismissal
rate after lqbal, though not all of the
increases are statistically significant."
And a single-digit increase in the
dismissal rate seems quite modest
compared to the cataclysm some
predicted.20 The question then is why.
One answer is that New Pleading
really isn't that different from Old
Pleading. In other words, it just isn't
a big deal. That answer is certainly
a possibility," but it ignores the
anecdotal evidence. Lower courts
almost universally hail the decisions
as, together, creating a sea change in
pleading standards.2 Judge Sidney H.
Stein, of the Southern District of New
York, for example, recently pronounced
that Twiqbal represents "a major shift
in how I have to approach motions to
dismiss."23 Another judge confessed,
"We district court judges suddenly and
unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled
over something we thought we knew
how to do with our eyes closed: dispose
of a motion to dismiss a case for failure
to state a claim."'24 One prominent
practitioner called Iqbal "the most
significant Supreme Court decision in a
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decade for day-to-day litigation in the
federal courts."2 The rampant belief
among judges, practitioners, and schol-
ars is that New Pleading is something
quite different.
The more likely explanation for the
lack of observable dismissal-rate changes
is that rational actors, confronted with
a meaningfully new standard, are
changing their conduct in ways that
end up masking, or mitigating, some of
the otherwise expected effects of New
Pleading.21 In addition, these responses
may be causing ancillary effects that
ought to be considered in assessing
New Pleading. In other words, rational
actors in the litigation marketplace can
be expected to react to the anticipated
implications of New Pleading, and
those reactions might cycle back to then
both affect the observable dismissal rate
and cause unintended effects. This part
explores some of those complexities.
Plaintiffs
The threat of facing a motion under
New Pleading appears to be induc-
ing plaintiffs to conduct more factual
investigation - even retaining
experts - prior to filing a claim.
Plaintiffs who choose to file are putting
more factual information into their
complaints in an effort to comply
with the strictures of New Pleading.27
Plaintiffs always have generally tended
to put more information in their
complaints than necessary, even before
Twombly, but New Pleading imposes
a legal standard that requires qualita-
tively important facts that seem to be
of a different and more specific ilk than
prior practice focused on.2
Rational plaintiffs who cannot
obtain through additional investi-
gation the facts needed to survive a
Twiqba motion might choose other
alternatives. A small number might
attempt to get that information
through state-court discovery mech-
anisms. A few state systems (namely,
Alabama, Connecticut, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas) allow
what the federal system does not:
presuit discovery.29 If a
plaintiff could obtain
presuit discovery from the
defendant in one of these
states, then the plaintiff
could potentially get
the information needed tl
to file a complaint that
would survive a Twiqbal T
motion in federal court.
Plaintiffs who cannot
obtain the additional infor-
mation needed potentially have
some options. One option is to
file suit in a state court that follows a
more liberal pleading rule than New
Pleading. State courts are free to adopt
their own pleading rules. And even if
the language of a state rule tracks Rule
8, the state is free to interpret its rule
as it wishes. So, perhaps a complaint
that would be screened out of federal
court by New Pleading could survive
in state court.
Several difficulties complicate this
option. The first difficulty is that as
of January 2015 only eight states -
Arizona, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana,
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and
West Virginia - have maintained
their liberal pleading standard in the
wake of Twomby.1 Thus, only a lawsuit
filed in one of these eight states could
be assured of avoiding a fact-based
pleading standard.
And filing in one of these state
courts may have its own disadvan-
tages. For example, the peculiarities of
state practice may be detrimental to
certain plaintiffs. In addition, personal
jurisdiction limitations may prevent
a litigant from filing in one of these
states.32 Finally, savvy defendants
may remove eligible cases from state
court to federal court, where the New
Pleading standard will apply.3
For these reasons, some plaintiffs
rationally will not file at all,3 4 or at
least will file fewer claims. Perhaps
some will try alternative dispute reso-




New Pleading in two ways.
The first is that the filing of
fewer claims in federal court
ought to reduce the dismissal rate
if those that are selected out at
filing also would have been dismissed
on motion. If so, then the observed
dismissal rate would understate the total
screening effect of New Pleading. The
second is that New Pleading induces
most plaintiffs to obtain additional
information before filing and to
include that additional information in
their complaints, making even those
cases that survive New Pleading more
expensive and burdensome for plain-
tiffs to file.
Defendants
Defendants also can be expected to
respond rationally to New Pleading.
Most obviously, with New Pleading
adding a new weapon to their arsenal,
defendants will file motions to dismiss
in more cases. New Pleading allows
new challenges to assertions as conclu-
sory and new challenges to claims
as factually implausible. Rational
defense-lawyer behavior should lead to
more motions filed.
The anecdotal evidence suggests a
significant uptick in the filing rates of
motions to dismiss after Iqbal. Survey
evidence reveals a dramatic increase
in motions,36 and prominent defense
lawyers have said publicly that they now
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file dismissal motions in nearly every
case.31 Some have even opined that the
failure to file a motion to dismiss could
now constitute legal malpractice.3"
Available empirical evidence
supports these anecdotes. In a study
of Rule 1 2(b)(6) motions, the Federal
Judicial Center found a statisti-
cally significant (to the 99 percent
confidence interval) increase in the
motion-filing rate of more than 50
percent.39 It seems clear that one effect
of New Pleading is the increase in the
filing of motions to dismiss.
In addition to affecting the inci-
dence of motions, New Pleading likely
also causes motions to be bigger and
more complicated. Prior to Twombly,
motions might justifiably focus
entirely upon the plaintiff's allegations
in the complaint and the scope of the
law. Now, in addition to those argu-
ments based on legal sufficiency,
defendants can argue for factual
insufficiency. That additional
argument may include sub-ar-
guments about what alle-
gations in the complaint
are conclusory, whether
the remaining nonconclusory allega-
tions establish a plausible entitlement
to relief, and what other information
might inform the judge's "judicial
experience and common sense."
The result is a far more compli-
cated, and more fact-intensive, motion
process. Although empirical evidence
on the quality of motions is not yet
available, theoretical commentary
suggests that dismissal motions are
starting to resemble more substantial
summary-judgment motions, with
their heavy emphasis on evidentiary
materials outside of the complaint.
4
As discussed above, complaints that
are fortunate to survive this intense scru-
tiny are likely to be far longer and more
factually detailed than pre-Twombly
complaints. Because answers must
respond to each allegation specifically,
41
defendants forced to answer these
complaints must file answers that are
likely to be longer, more difficult, and
more expensive to draft.
Thus, defense-side responses have
two primary effects on any assessment
of New Pleading. The first effect is
that, despite any plaintiff-side filing
screen imposed by New Pleading,
defense-side motions appear to
have increased after Iqbal.
The increase in the
motion-
e filing rate could
affect the
in the dismissal rate
ons and (as a function
of motions
-side costs filed) either
?n in cases positively or
negatively,
issal. They depending
D Costs of upon the
kinds of
)Iaintiffs cases in the





in the motion filing
rate ought to nega-
tively affect plaintiffs, for far more
cases that never would have faced a
motion to dismiss pre-Twombly will
face one post-Iqbal, and at least some
of those motions will be granted. In
the best study to date of this defense-
side selection effect of increased
motions, Jonah Gelbach has concluded
that the minimum negative effect on
plaintiffs is 15 percent. In other words,
at least 15 percent of cases dismissed
under New Pleading would not have
been dismissed under Old Pleading.41
His study supports the conclusion
that this defense-side selection effect
exacerbates New Pleading's negative
effect on plaintiffs.
The second effect is a cost effect. The
increases in the motion-filing rate and
in the complexity of both motions and
answers will cause defense-side costs of
litigation to increase, even in cases that
do not result in a dismissal. They also
will cause plaintiff-side costs of litiga-
tion to increase, as plaintiffs respond to
the more complex motions with their
own more complex opposition briefs.
Federal Courts
A third set of rational actors includes
federal judges wrestling with New
Pleading. There was some hope by
commentators in the immediate
aftermath of New Pleading that judges
might offer more lenient interpre-
tations of New Pleading, perhaps
playing off uncertainties remaining in
the doctrine and the low probability
of reversal. For example, Ben Spencer
proposed that courts could suspend
New Pleading strictures for plaintiffs
who could not be expected to marshal
the necessary facts because those facts
were in the hands of the defendants.,
Others proposed that New Pleading
could be limited to certain kinds of
cases of the same ilk as those at issue
in the specific cases in Twombly and
Iqbal.14 For the most part, however,
courts have rejected these options,
instead interpreting New Pleading to




Other commentators have argued
that the discovery rules permit formal
discovery while a motion to dismiss is
pending.46 Rule 26(c) allows a court
to stay discovery only upon a showing
of "good cause," and there is at least
an argument that the mere pendency
of a motion to dismiss is not "good
cause. "4 The idea is that a plaintiff
faced with a motion to dismiss based
on New Pleading could seek discovery
of the necessary facts while the motion
was pending, and a judge could delay
deciding the motion until the discov-
ery was complete.
The main problem with this line
of argument is that the language the
Supreme Court used in its Twombly
and Iqba/ opinions suggests that it
views discovery as unavailable if the
complaint cannot survive a motion to
dismiss. Twombly states that "it is only
by taking care to require allegations
that reach the level [of plausibility]
that we can hope to avoid the poten-
tially enormous expense of discovery"
4
and concludes that "before proceeding
to discovery, a complaint must allege
facts suggestive of illegal conduct.
'" 49
Iqbal asserts that "Rule 8 ... does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions"5 and concludes that "[b
ecause respondent's complaint is defi-
cient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to
discovery, cabined or otherwise.""
Thus, a plaintiff seeking to take
advantage of discovery before surviving
a motion to dismiss would have to file
an admittedly deficient complaint and
hope that a district judge would allow
discovery pending the motion despite
the Supreme Court's admonitions to the
contrary. The lower courts appear, in the
main, to have followed that admonition
and refused to allow discovery pending
a motion to dismiss.5 2
Still, it appears that at least some
judges are allowing discovery pending
a motion to dismiss." If that practice
becomes widespread enough, then
plaintiffs might be emboldened to file
factually insufficient complaints on the
hope that a judge will permit discov-
ery of the needed facts. Some judges
will, and others won't, so presumably
some plaintiffs will get the informa-
tion needed to survive the motion and
others won't. How many fall into each
category is an unanswered question
that nevertheless affects the assess-




What do these marketplace effects tell
us about the impact of New Pleading?
This part explores that question and
offers some thoughts for next steps.
The More We Know, the Less
We Know
Although initial New Pleading assess-
ments focused on dismissal rates, things
are clearly more complicated. Dismissal-
rate studies no doubt are an important
piece of the puzzle. But they are influ-
enced in ways that are not fully under-
stood or studied. Rational responses in
the litigation marketplace may temper
or exacerbate otherwise expected or
observed effects. As Gelbach's study
suggests, for example, the increase in
motions filed indicates that dismissal-
rate studies likely understate New
Pleading's effect. Similarly, we simply
do not know how many cases plaintiffs
siphon to other forums - such as state
courts - or decline to pursue at all; the
quality and quantity of those cases may
influence the observed dismissal rate.
The following list identifies just some
of the unknowns that may bear on an
accurate assessment of New Pleading's
dismissal-rate effect:
" The quality and quantity of cases
plaintiffs pursue in other forums,
such as state courts.
" The quality and quantity of cases
plaintiffs decline to pursue in any
forum.
" The quality and size of complaints
filed in federal court.
" The quality and quantity of motions
filed by defendants.
" The standards applied by federal
judges assessing complaints under
the New Pleading standard.
" The quality and scope (if any) of
pre-dismissal discovery opportuni-
ties federal courts afford plaintiffs.
" The rate and efficacy of amendments
to complaints.
4
These lacunae in our knowledge
base demonstrate that we still don't
really know with confidence what the
dismissal-rate effect of New Pleading
is. The dynamics of the litigation
marketplace make that a much more
difficult inquiry.
Yet even getting a more confident
grasp of the dismissal-rate effect is only
one piece of the puzzle. New Pleading's
screening effect at the filing stage, for
example, in addition to influencing the
observed dismissal-rate effect, is inde-
pendently important. In fact, it is a
necessary component of understanding
New Pleading's total screening effect.
Ideally, if New Pleading functions
as intended, plaintiffs with implau-
sible claims will not even file in the
first place, thereby sparing innocent
defendants even of the costs of filing a
motion to dismiss.5s
New Pleading's total screening
effect is not the final answer, however,
for we do not know the quality
of the cases being screened. If all
screened cases are meritless, then New
Pleading's screen may be normatively
desirable. But if meritorious cases are
being screened out when they other-
wise would have proceeded to favorable
judgment or settlement, then New
Pleading incurs a significant justice
problem, especially if meritorious
plaintiffs have been denied a reasonable
opportunity for discovery to bear that
merit out.6
There is some evidence that New
Pleading does screen out meritorious
cases, perhaps significantly so. In 2011,
Prof. Alexander Reinert published a
study finding that, of the studied cases
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that survived under Old Pleading but
would have been dismissed under New
Pleading, more than 5 5 percent were
meritorious.57 This merit-based percent-
age was statistically insignificant from a
control group that would have survived
New Pleading. Thus, Reinert concluded
that New Pleading's dismissal screen has
almost nothing to do with the meritori-
ous nature of the case.51 In a draft study,
Gelbach finds that summary-judgment
rates have not changed, leading him to
question the merits-screening efficacy of
New Pleading."
In addition to the merit of screened
cases, the kind of meritorious case
being screened could matter as well.
Screening meritorious claims of a
purely private nature - like, for
example, breach-of-contract actions -
presents an individual-justice prob-
lem for the uncompensated litigant.
But such cases are, theoretically, less
likely to be screened than meritori-
ous cases of a public or quasi-public
nature. Screening meritorious claims
of a public or quasi-public nature -
such as environmental, civil-rights,
antitrust, RICO, securities, mass-tort,
consumer, and discrimination claims,
just to name a few - presents both
individual- justice concerns and broader
regulatory-deterrence concerns.60 To
fully understand the impact of New
Pleading, both individual-justice
concerns and regulatory-deterrence
concerns must be considered.
The flip side of the normative
question of New Pleading's desirability
is its benefits. Its primary intended
benefit is the screening of meritless
cases at an earlier stage than otherwise
would occur, thereby saving innocent
defendants some litigation costs. But,
to date, there has been no study -
not one - of the cost savings of New
Pleading. We simply do not know
enough about the quantity or quality
of meritless cases being screened. It is
reasonable to assume that some screened
cases are meritless, but we do not know
the percentage. And we do not know
how much defense costs are reduced
by screening those meritless cases. It is
entirely possible that the cost savings
are quite low, especially if the kinds of
meritless cases screened are predom-
inantly low-cost prisoner civil-rights
claims." And, any cost savings must be
compared to alternative cost-savings
mechanisms that judges could employ
in discovery to protect defendants
from excessive litigation costs. In other
words, only the marginal cost savings
can be credited as a benefit of New
Pleading. We know next to zero about
all of this.
On the whole, then, we know very
little about the pros and cons of New
Pleading as it applies in practice. The
litigation marketplace, with its tangle
of dynamic responses and feedback
loops, complicates matters considerably.
Without knowing more, it is impossible
to formulate an accurate assessment of
New Pleading's intended effects.
ANCILLARY EFFECTS
New Pleading is having unintended
effects, too, and any assessment must
consider those unintended effects along
with the intended ones. Discussions of
two unintended effects follow.
Costs
The opinions in Twombly and Iqbal
were grounded in minimizing the
expense of litigation, particularly in
cases that had weak claims. Twombly
worried that "the threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defen-
dants to settle even anemic cases," and
concluded that "it is only by taking
care to require allegations that reach
the level suggesting conspiracy that
we can hope to avoid the potentially
enormous expense of discovery."'62 And
Iqba/ made clear that New Pleading is
a necessary hurdle to discovery.63
Screening more cases at the pleadings
stage may, indeed, reduce discovery
costs (though it is unclear exactly how
much). But that does not mean that
New Pleading will reduce litigation
costs as a whole. To the contrary, the
Federal Judicial Center has surmised
that New Pleading seems likely, "at
least in the short run, to increase
[rather] than decrease the costs of litiga-
tion in the broad spectrum of cases. 64
How could that be? The answer is
that New Pleading increases costs at
the pleading and motions stage. As
discussed above, plaintiffs are likely to
conduct more pre-filing investigation
and spend more attorney time drafting
bigger and more detailed complaints.
Defendants are filing more - perhaps
50 percent more - motions to
dismiss.65 Dismissals are usually with
leave to amend, which plaintiffs take
advantage of, sometimes successfully,
though they may face a second motion
to dismiss. Defendants who ultimately
must file an answer must respond to
bloated complaints with their own
bloated answers. These cost increases in
the pre-discovery phase could be even
greater than any cost savings in the
discovery phase.
To illustrate, consider the following
rough figures. Say 100 identical cases
are filed pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal.
Of these, around 13 face motions to
dismiss under either regime,66 and an
additional seven (a 50 percent increase)
face motions to dismiss under New
Pleading. One might be tempted to stop
here and conclude that the increased
costs amount to the seven additional
motions filed under New Pleading.
It is true that the seven new
motions are additional costs of New
Pleading. But it is a mistake to stop
there. The 13 cases that face motions
under either regime are likely to be
bigger, more complicated, and more
expensive motions post-Iqbal than
pre-Twombly. Further, in far more of
the cases, perhaps all 100, plaintiffs are
likely to spend more time and effort in
pre-filing investigation and in draft-
ing bigger, more factually detailed
complaints. The takeaway is that even
for cases that face the same motion-
filing result under both Old and New
Pleading, costs may increase.
Even the seven additional motions
entail more costs than just the inci-
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dence of a motion. As with the other
13, the motions are likely to be expen-
sive. And, some of those additional
motions (let's say two of the seven) will
be unsuccessful, meaning that these
two cases absorbed significant addi-
tional cost for the same result as under
Old Pleading.
Of the five successful motions,
most dismissals will be with leave to
replead, and repleading is fruitful for
some, say two. Thus, two more cases
absorbed very significant additional
costs (increased expense drafting the
complaint, a New Pleading motion,
and an amended complaint) for the
same successful result.
Thus, in this hypothetical scenario,
the observable benefit of New Pleading
is an earlier dismissal in 3 percent of
cases, though we have no estimate of
the cost savings likely to result. This
benefit must be contrasted with the
potential injustice if some of the 3
percent are meritorious cases erro-
neously screened. The benefit also
must be contrasted with the increased
expense New Pleading potentially
imposes on the vast majority of all
cases filed. It is entirely possible that
the increased costs alone render New
Pleading a net cost to the system. At
this time, we cannot say for sure. But
we ought to find out.
Federalism
New Pleading also has more latent
systemic effects. One potential effect is
a shadow effect on state courts, which
also are actors in the litigation market-
place. As noted above, some state
courts have rejected New Pleading.
But six others (so far) have adopted
or endorsed it." Widespread adop-
tion risks creating the perception that
states and state courts are, in the main,
mere followers rather than intellectual
independents."
In the U.S. federal system, states
are free to create their own procedures,
including pleading rules. Federal-court
interpretations of ederal rules have no
force of law on the interpretation or
development of state procedural rules.
Thus, state courts are well within
their spheres of power to reject New
Pleading in state court.
To be clear, some state following
raises little to no concern. If the state
court adopts the reasoning of a federal
court because that reasoning applies
equally and persuasively to state law
and policy and is consistent with any
controlling state-codified law, then
state courts can be seen as using inde-
pendent judgment to reach the same
conclusion as a separate court.
But the adoption of New Pleading
by states that previously endorsed
Conley raises more concern. It is highly
suspicious that, after 50 years of
adherence to Conley, these state courts
happened to conclude independently
- just after the Supreme Court did
- that their pleading rules require
New Pleading strictures, too. The
suspicion could cause one to conclude
that states have adopted New Pleading
simply because the U.S. Supreme
Court adopted it instead of exercising
rigorous independent judgment in
accordance with state law and policy.
I do not mean to suggest that a state
court should never follow federal
precedent. The District of
Columbia, for example,
is governed by a stat-
ute that requires its . .
courts to follow




local rules to favoraL
mandate
a different then New
result.69 For
this reason, justice pr
the D.C.




construed its rule to
- which mirrors
Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure - to have the
same scope as that given by Twombly
and Iqbal.76
Unless some codified law directs
state courts to follow federal prece-
dents, state courts adopting federal
interpretations should do more than
adopt them on the ground that they are
from the U.S. Supreme Court." That
should not be hard to do. For example,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
adopted Twombly after noting that the
federal and state rules were identical
and determining that the rationale
of Twombly applied to the kind of
civil-perjury claims at issue, and that
the Twombly standard was needed to
further the state policy of curbing
abusive use of those claims.2 And the
Supreme Court of Nebraska offered
a defensible assessment of New




have not articulated suffi-
cient justification for
following Twombly and
Iqbal. For example, the
Minnesota Supreme
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Court has followed operative language
from Twombly without any explanation
at all.74 The Supreme Court of South
Dakota adopted Twombly merely because
the federal rule and the state rule both
use the word "showing," but it offered
no reasoning based on state policy or
the correctness (or even persuasiveness)
of Twombly.11 And in Massachusetts,
although courts had followed the "no
set of facts" standard of Conley for more
than 30 years, the Supreme Judicial
Court followed Twombly in an opinion
that simply stated, without explana-
tion, that the court "agree[dl" with
Twombly's analysis."
Blindly following federal prec-
edent when it is not controlling,
as Minnesota, South Dakota, and
Massachusetts have done with New
Pleading, devalues both state law and
state courts. It devalues state law by
refusing to countenance that state law
could demand a different result. And
it devalues state courts by creating the
perception that they do not exercise
the rigorous, independent analysis that
becomes the judicial function.
Now, state courts could avoid this
devaluation entirely by demonstrating
more rigorous reasoning in their opin-
ions. But the U.S. Supreme Court could
help by recognizing the state courts
as eager marketplace consumers. A
Twombly or Iqbal footnote emphasizing
the limited reach of federal-court inter-
pretations of federal rules and acknowl-
edging that even analogous state rules
may demand different interpretation
could help spur state courts to rational-
ize adoption more rigorously. Without
such cautionary signals, New Pleading
risks contributing to the depreciation of
state law and state courts.
MOVING FORWARD
Situating New Pleading in the broader
litigation marketplace reveals a
number of insights. First, it accentu-
ates the need for more sophisticated
study of intended effects, ancillary
effects, and costs. The existing empir-
ical and anecdotal studies are good
initial steps. But, they are but a small
part of the information necessary to
assess New Pleading holistically."
Second, information sharing ought
to be a two-way street. Market partic-
ipants both consume and produce
information. They consume informa-
tion to make informed decisions, while
their decisions then produce additional
information to be consumed by others.
Yet the information consumed by
market participants is rarely complete.
Market participants with broad
consumptive and productive capacity
(such as the Supreme Court) along with
market "outsiders" (such as academ-
ics, rulemakers, and legislatures"0) can
better ensure that the information they
produce gets to, and is consumed by,
market participants.
For example, parties and courts may
find it useful to understand the poten-
tial costs of increased motion practice
under New Pleading. They also could
benefit from clarifications of how New
Pleading and discovery could work
together. State courts perhaps could
benefit from better information on
the impact of New Pleading in federal
court and on the differences between
federal and state litigation and plead-
ing practice. In short, New Pleading
presents an opportunity for both
market participants and traditional
outsiders to make a real difference
through the dissemination of studies
and scholarship.
Third, New Pleading offers an oppor-
tunity for procedural scholars to bring
together a rich, interdisciplinary mix
of theory, practice, empirics, doctrine,
political science, economics, and norma-
tivity. Simply put, it is an exciting time
to be an American proceduralist.
Conclusion
Assessments of New Pleading to date
have focused on directly observable
effects, namely, New Pleading's effect
on dismissal rates. I have argued here
that this focus elides the complexity
that the litigation marketplace imparts
to dismissal-rate studies. And the story
of dismissal rates deemphasizes poten-
tially more important stories of costs
and other ancillary effects.
In some ways, though, we can
relish the fact that the focus once
again is on pleadings. Perhaps it is
time to have another "war" - or
at least a debate. New studies and
scholarship might lead to intriguing
new possibilities domestically. That,
at least, is worth applauding.
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